Category Archives: Charter School Authorization

The Great Charter School Clean Up?

 

Florida, Arizona, and Texas are known for having large charter school markets with large variation in quality.

Taking the first letter from each state name, let’s call these the FAT states.

All told, charter sectors in FAT states serve about 750,000 students (AZ = 180,000,FL = 280,000, TX = 280,000) – or about 25% of all charter students in the country.

Results in the FAT states have been mixed.

Here is what CREDO found in 2015 when they studied Texas charter school data:

Screen Shot 2016-02-06 at 10.13.34 AM

Even in urban areas, where charters usually perform the best, Texas charters lag compared to their traditional peers.

Previous CREDO studies in Arizona and Florida have found negative to mediocre results; however, more recent studies, especially those focusing on attainment, have found more positive results.

But, in terms of matched test results, the FAT states tend to poorly when compared to the charter sectors of Louisiana, Colorado, and Massachusetts.

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The FAT states split the reform community.

For many of those whose posts show up on Jay Green’s blog, the FAT states are exactly what we need: high levels of entrepreneurship, disruption, and parent choice.

For many of those whose posts show up on CRPE’s blog, the FAT states have serious shortcomings: they represent the triumph of free market mania over the pragmatic restraints of quality control.

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But something interesting is happening in the FAT states.

They are closing a lot of charter schools.

Last year, Florida closed 35 charter schools; Arizona closed 30 charters schools; and Texas closed 62 charter schools.

In Florida, regulators closed ~5% of all charter schools in a single year.

In Arizona, regulators closed ~6% of all charter schools in a single year. 

In Texas, regulators closed ~8% of all charter schools in a single year.

These rates are higher than the national charter school closure rates of ~4%.

In the case of Texas, their closure rate was double the national average.

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We will learn much from the behavior of the FAT states (the next great charter paper must be lurking in this data).

Here are questions for which I would love to know the answer:

  1. How do the schools that are being closed compare to district schools peers in terms of academic growth, post-secondary attainment, earnings, and parent and student satisfaction?
  2. Over a long-period (25 years?) is it better for a state to let a thousand flowers bloom and then clean up the sector or to put on tight quality controls at the outset and then  allow for measured replication? Or somewhere in-between?
  3. How does the size of a charter sector affect its political support in the state legislature?
  4. How does the quality of a charter sector affect its political support in the state legislature?
  5. How does support in the state legislature affect quality control measures?

I’m sure there is more to be mined from the behavior of the FAT states.

The MySpace Strategy

my space

The Philadelphia School Reform Commission just approved five new charters. It received 39 applications.

All new charters were granted to existing operators.*

I don’t know enough about Philadelphia to weigh in on the optimal political strategy for increasing high-quality charters. Perhaps this was all that was politically feasible at the moment.

More worrisome is the implicit strategy of these approvals: only expand what already exists.

In other words: don’t allow to form; keep Facebook from going live; squash Tumblr before it begins; reject LinkedIn; no need for Instagram.

Why take risks on new organizations when you have MySpace?

*Note: nothing in this post is meant to diminish the great work of existing operators such as Mastery. Their accomplishments are irrelevant to the point I’m trying to make.

Is DC PCSB the Best Charter Authorizer in the Nation?

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A strong argument could be made. The case for the DC Public Charter School Board would look something like this:

1. There are many authorizers, working in cities such as Boston, Newark, and New Orleans, that have created charter sectors with strong effect sizes.

2. However, there are few authorizers that inherited a weak charter sector (due in part to poor district authorizing), and then turned the sector around to the point where the sector now achieves ~.1 effect sizes when compared to the traditional sector.

3. PCSB did exactly this.

4. And they did it at scale: achieving nearly 50% market share in a major urban area.

If you want to learn more, Dell just did a case study on PCSB. You can read about it here.

One last note: the following table was also in the report:

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This data is from 2012-13, so not sure how things have changed, but I was surprised to see that only 61% of district students are eligible for free and reduced lunch. In the aggregate, DCPS is socioeconomically diverse district.

My guess is that this, masks three distinct subgroups: schools with very high free and reduced lunch rates, schools with mixed socioeconomic rates, and schools that primarily serve the wealthy.

In many ways, each of these subgroups is probably a district unto itself.

I’d be curious to see DCPS performance broken out by schools with below 35% FRL; 35-75% FRL; and 76%+FRL.

Does anyone have this data?